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Abstract 
This paper examines the successful business strategy employed by Southwest Airlines with 
special respect to the recent theories of Paul Lawrence. Long-time professor of organizational 
behavior at Harvard Business School, Lawrence posited that Renewed Darwinian theory 
reflected four basic human drives: acquisition, defense, comprehension, and bonding. Given 
Michael Porter’s assessment of the distinctions between cost leadership and differentiation, my 
analysis reveals that Southwest succeeded in maintaining its competitive market niche for the 
air-travel industry by engaging in a strongly economistic, cost leadership strategy that primarily 
incorporated and prioritized aspects of the drives to acquire and defend. In doing so it displayed 
greater vision and operational effectiveness than its competitors (such as Continental Lite, for 
example). 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this specific paper on strategy and economic theory is to examine the recent 
academic theories of the late Harvard professor Paul Lawrence that were initially consolidated in 
his book, co-authored with Nitin Nohria, titled Driven: How Human Nature Shapes Our Choices 
(2002), and their specific validity when it comes to the case of Southwest Airlines. Given that 
Lawrence was a senior and respected professor of organizational behavior at Harvard, and 
Nohria is now Dean of the Harvard Business School, their findings merit special academic 
consideration especially when explored alongside the long-established and insightful theories of 
Michael Porter (also a Harvard University professor) concerning strategy, differentiation, and 
cost leadership. Shortly before he passed away, Lawrence also authored Driven to Lead: Good, 
Bad and Misguided Leadership (2010) in which he continued to build on the theories first put 
forward by him and Nohria in his earlier text. Lawrence was of the opinion that in addition to the 
two fundamental Darwinian drives—those concerned with acquisition and defense—two other 
drives (those that relate to comprehension and bonding) are necessary for success when it comes 
to business matters in general and corporate affairs in particular. However, my specific analysis 
of the case of Southwest Airlines both implicitly and explicitly indicates that only the two 
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original Darwinian drives are predominantly vital to the smooth running of an organization that 
prioritizes cost leadership strategy.  
 
In what some may regard as an exemplary exercise in interdisciplinary thinking, Lawrence read 
extensively on topics such as psychology, neuroscience, and social studies and combined his 
newly acquired knowledge with his sound expertise in Management Studies in order to construct 
an analytical model termed Renewed Darwinian theory. In a useful academic article titled 
‘Humanism in Business: Towards a Paradigm Shift?’ Pirson and Lawrence (2010) postulate the 
following:  
 
In essence RD [Renewed Darwinian] theory illuminates how the human brain has developed via natural 
selection and also through sex and group selection mechanisms to make complex decisions regarding all 
aspects of life (personal, communal, and societal). It posits four basic drives, ultimate motives that underlie 
all human decisions (p. 556). 
 
The critics claim that two primal drives exist in all creatures that engage in some form of self-
preservation. These are the drive to acquire (dA) those resources that are fundamental to the 
sustenance of life, and the drive to defend (dD) oneself (successfully, and at times ruthlessly) 
from external threats. However, Pirson and Lawrence also posit that on a gradual basis humans 
specifically developed two newer drives, namely the drive to bond (dB) and the drive to 
comprehend (dC). The two latter drives are integral to the critics’ central thesis: that human 
bonding and mental comprehension make for a better and more humanistic system of business 
governance and management. According to Lawrence economistic and profit-driven systems of 
business have relied too heavily in the past on simply focusing on the desire to acquire and 
defend power, money, and influence. This results in the creation of specific types of leaders 
whom he regards as being people without conscience. He and Pirson argue that future business 
models need to be more humanistic and hence less economistic in nature; moreover, they can do 
this by more actively exhibiting the drives to bond and comprehend. From the general 
perspective of Management Studies and the more particular vantage-point of theories involving 
strategy it is fruitful to examine what implications Lawrence’s theories might have for cost 
leadership and differentiation strategy. Porter’s views on strategy posit that firms can seek to 
engage in cost leadership behavior which combines low-cost strategy with a strong desire to 
acquire a competitive advantage in the market. Since cost leadership behavior is inherently 
economistic in nature it is also primarily utilitarian in scale and scope. Insofar as original 
Darwinian theory is concerned one may assume that cost leadership reflects a strong desire to 
acquire revenue and profits, and defend the firm’s financial position competitively in relation to 
other firms. This is a traditional management-related view of competitive strategy that derives its 
legitimacy from a fundamentally market-based approach, and one that has been adhered to by 
Southwest Airlines since the organization’s inception. 
 
Literature Review 
Since this article demonstrates a completely original topic, i.e. one that has not been 
academically examined before, the research material for this article falls into two main 
categories. The first of these relates to Lawrence’s theories which have been propounded in two 
books of which the text Driven to Lead (2010) is the most recent. As noted in the above 
introduction Pirson and Lawrence (2010) have additionally examined the humanistic aspects of 
this theory. The second category involves studies such as an article by Morrison (2001) that 
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dwell specifically on the history of Southwest Airlines and the various factors (most notably 
enhanced competition) that have contributed towards the airline’s success as an established 
corporate organization. In her book-length study on Southwest titled The Southwest Airlines Way 
(2003) Brandeis University professor Gittell (2003) assesses that:  
 
Although Southwest’s growth seems rapid and sudden, in fact the company has grown at a nearly 
consistent annual rate of 10 to 15 percent over the 32 years of its existence as part of a very deliberate 
philosophy of controlled growth (p. 7). 
 
This point is validated by recent and current SWOT analyses and market reports for Southwest 
Airlines carried out by Marketline (2016). The task of this article is to create a specific case 
study, not simply one that focuses on Southwest’s general performance but rather one that 
addresses whether its strategies validate the Lawrence paradigm or not. Gittell further notes that 
in 1993, the U.S. Department of Transportation implicitly bestowed a distinction on Southwest 
by claiming that it was:  
 
the dominant airline in the United States because of the effect it was beginning to have on the rest of the 
industry. They coined a new term—the “Southwest effect”—the change in fares and passenger volumes 
that is observed when Southwest enters a market. According to the report, when Southwest announces 
service on a new route, other airlines serving that route almost immediately reduce their fares, and 
sometimes increase their frequencies as well (Gittell, 2003, p. 7).  
 
This strongly competitive aspect of Southwest has also been extensively examined by Morrison 
(2001). Regarding the (contrasting) differentiation model Jones and Butler (1988) note:  
 
[A] successful differentiation strategy insulates a business from competitive rivalry and captures customers 
by creating customer loyalty and lowering customer sensitivity to price. … On the other hand, cost 
leadership implies that the firm is attempting to capture customers primarily through price, and this is a 
more market-like governance mechanism (p. 204).  
 
Certainly, insofar as competitive business is concerned there are advantages to both strategic 
models, but given Pirson and Lawrence’s humanistic ideas one must carefully analyze whether 
those ideas are applicable and strongly relevant to Porter’s (2011) schema of cost leadership and 
differentiation. 
 
Methodology 
As already indicated earlier while the methodology for this article falls under the general 
category of a case-study approach, the main point of the article is not just a simple case-based 
examination of Southwest’s strategies but rather of viewing those strategies in light of the 
Lawrence paradigm in order to determine whether (and if so, why) the airline’s strategy 
resonates most strongly with certain Darwinian drives as opposed to others. Marketline’s (2016) 
relatively recent company profile of Southwest that engages in a full SWOT analysis of the 
airline claims that:  
 
Robust operating strategy allows the company to achieve high asset utilization and reliable on-time 
performance, which in turn helps the company to increase its revenues and to tap profitable markets. 
However, intense competition could adversely impact the company’s operating results, financial condition 
and liquidity (p. 4).  
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An examination of one of Southwest’s major competitors is therefore necessary in order to begin 
to underscore how Southwest utilizes the drives to acquire and defend over and above those that 
entail comprehension and bonding. The methodology below will focus on contrasting 
Southwest’s performance with that of one of its main competitors (Continental Lite) and relating 
this contrast to Lawrence’s Renewed Darwinian theories. This will lead towards an examination 
of how Southwest’s strategic principles implicitly underscore its successful cost leadership 
strategies. 
 
In order to achieve these specific aims one can examine the comparative cases of competing 
business strategies employed by Southwest Airlines and Continental Lite. Southwest commenced 
operations in the late 1960s and has survived for close to fifty years by adhering to a remarkably 
sound low-cost strategy that also works in tandem with the company’s noted operational 
effectiveness. In his influential essay titled What is Strategy? leading business academician 
Porter (2011) claims that as opposed to full-service airlines Southwest by contrast strives for 
highly economical service that maximizes customer convenience:  
 
Through fast turn-arounds at the gate of only 15 minutes, Southwest is able to keep planes flying longer 
hours than rivals and provide frequent departures with fewer aircraft. Southwest does not offer meals, 
assigned seats, interline baggage checking, or premium classes of service. Automated ticketing at the gate 
encourages customers to bypass travel agents, allowing Southwest to avoid their commissions. A 
standardized fleet of 737 aircraft boosts the efficiency of maintenance. Southwest has staked out a unique 
and valuable strategic position based on a tailored set of activities. On the routes served by Southwest, a 
full-service airline could never be as convenient or as low cost (p. 9).  
 
It is evident from Porter’s summary that Southwest operates, and has operated, from a distinctly 
cost leadership position, and indeed its customers are fully aware of the numerous benefits and 
advantages of the firm’s consistent use of this type of strategy.  
 
Southwest’s customers’ priorities may thus be considered to be aligned with those of the airline 
itself, where travelling between destinations quickly and cheaply takes precedence over and 
above perks such as airline meals. These cost-cutting measures on the part of Southwest ensure 
that its specific body of customers (i.e. those who wish primarily to travel at cheap rates) remain 
consistently satisfied. Naturally those individuals who require the added benefits of classes of 
service, etc. have to consider looking elsewhere for travel purposes. In aggregate, Southwest’s 
success can be gauged by noting that over the years it has maintained its reputation for cost 
efficiency and currently rakes in a revenue of approximately 20 billion US dollars. It should also 
be underscored that in light of Paul Lawrence’s Renewed Darwinian theory Southwest has 
displayed a greater implicit emphasis on the drives to acquire and defend as opposed to those 
related to bonding and comprehension. Some element of the drive to comprehend would 
definitely have been manifested in the creation of the original cost leadership vision of the 
airline; however, that comprehension of its ultimate goals would have necessarily fed into 
important acquisition of revenue and also into defending the market niche/position. In a study of 
Southwest’s competitive position conducted in 1998, Morrison (2001) noted that estimated 
savings to air travelers: 
 
due to competition from Southwest was $ 12.9 billion. Southwest’s low fares were directly responsible for 
$ 3.4 billion of these savings to passengers. The remaining $ 9.5 billion represents the effect that actual, 
adjacent, and potential competition from Southwest had on other carriers’ fares. These savings amount to 
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20 per cent of the airline industry’s 1998 domestic scheduled passenger revenue and slightly more than half 
of the fare reductions attributed to airline deregulation—a sizable impact from a carrier that accounts for 
about 7 per cent of the industry’s domestic scheduled passenger miles (p. 254). 
 
Given these statistics it is safe to assume that no airline that did not prioritize acquisition and 
defense would have been able to achieve such staggering competitive aims. 
 
It is therefore entirely understandable that competing airlines such as Continental would have 
wanted to duplicate Southwest’s financial merits and general success. However, airlines that 
were operating using strategies of differentiation found that trying to duplicate Southwest’s 
economistic strategy necessitated considerable trade-offs. In the early 1990s in order to become a 
viable competitor for Southwest’s corner of the air-travel market Continental Airlines attempted 
to straddle between its present position and a newer, more cost-leadership oriented position. It 
created a subsidiary branch named Continental Lite that was aimed at serving customers the way 
that Southwest had been doing for the past thirty years. In describing how Continental Airlines 
decided to straddle between strategies and attempted to imitate some of Southwest’s low-cost 
features by creating Continental Lite, Porter (2011) assesses that finally it was poor trade-offs 
that proved eminently detrimental, both at the financial and executive levels, to Continental Lite. 
Excessive delays and affiliated problems related to slow baggage transfers (which unfortunately 
prove fatal when it comes to the smooth running of most airlines) contributed to complaints 
against the airline that piled up at an alarming rate. Porter (2011) further summarizes that:  
 
Continental Lite could not afford to compete on price and still pay standard travel-agent commissions but 
neither could it do without agents for its full-service business. The airline compromised by cutting 
commissions for all Continental flights across the board. Similarly, it could not afford to offer the same 
frequent-flier benefits to travelers paying the much lower ticket prices for Lite service. It compromised 
again by lowering the rewards of Continental’s entire frequent-flier program (p. 19).  
 
Unfortunately, within two years from its launch in 1993 Continental Lite folded completely, 
losing a couple of hundred million dollars and sustaining some damage to Continental’s 
reputation. Obviously Continental Airline’s management strategists and executives could not 
have predicted that their competitive brain-child would be such a colossal failure since no firm 
wishes to actively risk both its funds and image in this manner.  What failed them during the 
planning stages of their venture was the drive to comprehend. Indeed, the reason Continental Lite 
went belly-up was because even its top management strategists did not fully comprehend or 
appreciate the impact that the abovementioned economic trade-offs would have on both 
operational effectiveness as well as (consequently) general revenue. However, it is important to 
point out at this juncture that the drive to comprehend serves the more major, overriding drives 
to acquire and defend since the latter are directly related to revenue generation and 
augmentation. 
 
Regarding such substantial shifts in leadership and management strategies McGee, Dowling, and 
Megginson (1995) note that:  
 
Both the transaction cost and strategic behavior approaches suggest the effects of cooperative behavior may 
be driven by the experience and capabilities possessed by the management team. For example transaction 
costs can conceivably be lowered if the management team writing and enforcing the cooperative contracts 
is more knowledgeable about competitive trends. … Strategic behavior theory suggests that a management 
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team will choose partners and types of cooperative activities in order to improve a firm’s competitive 
position (p. 566).  
 
The main problem vis-a-vis the scenario just delineated above had to do with inept planning and 
incomplete comprehension which led to Continental’s inability to create and sustain a 
competitive position relative to Southwest, let alone maintain such a position on a long-term 
basis. The airline was unable to move from a more differentiated position to one of greater cost 
leadership because unless one can handle the substantial trade-offs involved one cannot smoothly 
and efficiently move along the strategy curve towards far lower costs and better revenue. It is not 
that Continental demonstrated any marked indifference towards their customers or an active 
failure to exhibit the drive to bond. Rather the problem was primarily not so much one related to 
a lack of bonding as much as a lack of comprehension. Moreover, since effective comprehension 
helps translate to success in competitive business, the failure of Continental’s drive to 
comprehend had a direct impact on Continental Lite’s ability to acquire and defend. Putting the 
matter in a nutshell, Southwest’s competitor thought it could straddle strategies effectively when 
in point of fact it emphatically could not.  
 
In addition to this, from a strategic point of view it is important to note that simple operational 
effectiveness would not have guaranteed Continental Lite’s competitive advantage over 
Southwest. For many firms that have found themselves in a similar position Porter (2011) 
asserts:  
 
The root of the problem is the failure to distinguish between operational effectiveness and strategy. The 
quest for productivity, quality, and speed has spawned a remarkable number of management tools and 
techniques: total quality management, benchmarking, time-based competition, outsourcing, partnering, 
reengineering, change management. Although the resulting operational improvements have often been 
dramatic, many companies have been frustrated by their inability to translate those gains into sustainable 
profitability (p. 2).  
 
The reason that Southwest Airlines has sustained its profits and good reputation for close to five 
decades is because alongside operational effectiveness it has consistently sought to sustain its 
strategy of cost leadership. Moreover, it has always kept in mind the fact that there are 
considerable trade-offs associated with shifting or changing its position and has repeatedly 
demonstrated a skillful and wise use of the drive to comprehend when shaping its ongoing vision 
as regards acquisition of profits and defense of competitive position.  
 
Porter is by no means the only academic to comment favorably on Southwest’s management 
policies. Gadiesh and Gilbert (2011) opine that in the case of Southwest Airlines:  
 
employees have consistently made trade-offs in keeping with the company’s strategic principle. The 
process for making important and complicated decisions about things like network design, service 
offerings, route selection and pricing, cabin design, and ticketing procedures is straightforward. That is 
because the trade-offs required by the strategic principle are clear (pp. 201-202).  
 
I have already dwelt at length above on the manner in which Continental failed to comprehend 
and manage the trade-offs that were necessary to compete successfully with Southwest. Not only 
are the trade-offs required by Southwest very clearly evident to its employees, so too is 
Southwest’s main strategic principle: it prides itself on being the low-cost airline. Gadiesh and 
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Gilbert (2011) further emphasize that while the mission of any organization is a vital part of its 
culture and aims, it is its fundamental strategic principle that drives its activities. In other words, 
the strategic principle is action-oriented as opposed to simply aspirational. They claim that a 
sound strategic principle (as opposed to a company’s aspirational mission):  
 
is also crucial when a company is experiencing rapid growth. During such times, it’s increasingly the case 
that less-experienced managers are forced to make decisions about nettlesome issues for which there may 
be no precedent. A clear and precise strategic principle can help counteract this shortage of experience 
(Gadiesh & Gilbert, 2011, p. 198).  
 
Not only is Southwest’s strategic principle crystal-clear, the company’s aim of being the low-cost 
airline implicitly incorporates the two major drives identified by Darwin and necessarily 
underscored by Lawrence—those of (revenue) acquisition and defense of competitive position. 
Greene (2009) encapsulates the importance of precise strategy formation in the following quote: 
‘A mind that is easily overwhelmed by emotion, that is rooted in the past instead of the present, 
that cannot see the world with clarity and urgency, will create strategies that will always miss the 
mark’ (Greene, 2009, p. 1). The sense of purpose with which Southwest Airlines employs its 
overarching cost leadership strategies rarely misses the mark. In spite of the fact that all four of 
the drives identified by Lawrence are incorporated into Southwest’s strategic aims, the specific 
nature of those aims (especially cost leadership strategy) necessitate that the drives to acquire 
and defend remain paramount to the airline’s agenda. 
 
Findings 
Therefore, we find that Southwest Airlines’ success and longevity has resulted in part from its 
consistent maintenance of a low-cost, operationally effective position, as well as a finely-
developed strategic understanding (comprehension) of what it needs to do in order to defend its 
niche in the air-travel market. Obviously, it also engages in some level of bonding with its 
customers since they have remained satisfied with the company’s performance and activities 
over the years. However, in the case of Southwest specifically it should be noted that the 
respective drives to comprehend and bond definitively serve the greater, overarching drives to 
acquire and defend. Continental Lite failed because it was unable to replicate Southwest’s 
primarily economistic (and originally Darwinian) strategy. Over the years, Southwest has 
emerged as an eminently stable organization, given that it aptly demonstrates and satisfies the 
Darwinian drive to defend. While Porter has written extensively about this and can accurately be 
regarded as a premier expert in strategic management, other noteworthy academics have also 
commented on the manner in which business strategies may be classified, and their opinions are 
worth mentioning here. For instance, Blumentritt and Danis (2006) underscore that Miles and 
Snow’s typology claims the existence of:  
 
three stable archetypal organizations—termed defenders, analyzers, and prospectors—each with its own 
distinctive strategy. Defenders pursue narrow market domains, rarely make adjustments in their technology, 
structure, or methods of operation and devote primary attention to improving efficiency. In contrast, 
prospectors almost continuously search for market opportunities, possess flexible technologies, and are 
creators of change (p. 277). 
 
It is plausible to assume that Southwest Airlines would clearly fall into the first category—that of 
a defender. The fact that it almost exclusively uses 737 aircrafts, follows a strategic principle that 
advocates and adheres to low-costs, efficiently delivers what it promises to customers, actively 
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attempts to maximize profits and acquire revenue, and displays a marked tendency to defend its 
niche in its market domain, makes it a prime example of an organization that highlights the 
importance of economistic behavior, and from the perspective of Lawrence’s theories Southwest 
highlights the importance of the two major drives identified in original Darwinian theory.  
 
Conclusion 
In spite of his theories regarding what he perceives to be the ideal balancing of all four drives by 
corporate leaders Paul Lawrence himself notes that reality often contradicts aspects of even the 
finest theory. In Driven to Lead (2010) he writes almost sardonically:  
 
We find it hard to imagine the CEO of a cigarette company sponsoring basic scientific research on the 
suspected health risk of his company’s product, assuring himself of the dire results, immediately warning 
the public to stop smoking, stopping the promotion of smoking, and letting his company’s sales drop 
(Lawrence, 2010, p. 169).  
 
As a parallel corollary to this statement one can safely posit that no CEO of Southwest Airlines 
can afford to underestimate the importance of cost leadership strategy to both the day-to-day 
operations of the company as well as its general long-term vision, and hence is unlikely to 
drastically change his or her leadership approach to Southwest’s general management. In 
concluding one therefore returns full circle to estimating how Southwest’s success would fit in 
with humanistic practices underscored by Paul Lawrence—practices that according to him 
emphasize the drives to bond and comprehend at least as much as (if not more than) the drives to 
acquire and defend. In the case of Southwest Airline’s strategic behavior at least (especially as I 
have delineated it in the methodology section of this paper) the absolutely blunt answer is that 
Southwest’s success owes far more to economism and utilitarianism as opposed to humanism. 
This is not to say that Southwest is anti-humanistic; rather, its position as an archetypal defender 
that engages in cost leadership strategy prioritizes the drives for acquisition and defense over and 
above the more recent ones underscored by Lawrence. However, Lawrence’s research certainly 
acts as a useful foil by means of which one can better understand the way in which some 
organizations have continued to thrive strategically over the years. Commenting on Paul 
Lawrence’s book Driven to Lead, reviewer Hurst (2011) feels it incumbent upon him to reveal 
the pitfalls that may arise from prescribing too zealously to the critic’s humanistic position:  
 
Lawrence is a distinguished management academic, and his provocative book is highly critical of the 
economic frameworks that have dominated management thinking in recent times. But like many academics, 
he seems to assume that new ideas can be substituted for old without changing people’s habits’ (Hurst, 
2011, para. 5).  
 
Hurst’s points are well-taken but a major management academic at the tail-end of an illustrious 
career (a category into which Lawrence can safely be placed) should be commended for taking a 
critical stance that can potentially lead to thought-provoking reassessments within the complex 
field of business management. Moreover, to be perfectly fair-minded one cannot avoid taking 
some risks when it comes to ongoing new research in business academe especially if one wishes 
to develop a better understanding (by default if no other means) of why certain tried and true 
management strategies have persisted, in spite of obstacles, over the course of decades. Thus 
obliquely, if not directly, Lawrence’s interdisciplinary work enables us to better comprehend and 
appreciate the economistic success of an airline whose management strategy aptly illustrates the 
principle of survival of the fittest. 
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